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The conventional understanding of citizen
participation in formal or quasi-formal pro-
cesses of public policy making is flawed, empiri-
cally and conceptually, in two major ways.
First, there is a dominant focus on the participa-
tion of individual citizens. 1 In this paper we
demonstrate, in relation to Sa˜o Paulo in partic-
ular, that this focus is in many ways misplaced.
Civil organizations, representing different sec-
tors of the poor, participate in substantial num-
bers in formal participatory institutions and are
likely to have substantial influence within such
institutions. Second, the civil society approach
dominant in research and policy on participa-
tion obscures the close connection between di-
rect and representative forms of democracy. 2
In particular, detailed fieldwork in Sa˜o Paulo
shows that the organizations that are most
likely to represent the poor in participatory
institutions are those well connected to the ac-
tors of classic representative democracy—politi-
cal parties and state agencies. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, these civil organizations951are not coopted, but instead are more likely
than their poorly connected counterparts to
organize public demonstrations and to make
demands on the government through multiple
channels.
In this paper, we present the evidence on
these points and locate them more broadly in
the current debate on civil society, participa-
tory institutions, and their intersection. This
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wave of studies that used forms of comparative
anecdotalism to make generalizations—that is,
findings from individual case studies of actors
or participatory institutions are pooled to-
gether into broad explanations. 3 This paper
is part of a second wave of studies that builds
on the insights of the first but uses more sys-
tematic forms of comparative analysis to draw
generalizable conclusions. In particular, the
paper uses comparisons across different types
of civil organizations and formal participatory
institutions—the city’s participatory budget,
sectoral policy councils, and lesser known par-
ticipatory institutions—to identify who repre-
sents the poor within processes of public
policy making. The analysis uses data from a
survey of civil organizations that work with
or for lower income groups in the city of Sa˜o
Paulo (population of 10 million, within munici-
pal boundaries), undertaken in 2002.
Seven broad lessons emerge from the analysis
of the survey’s results. The first five are empiri-
cal. (i) Civil organizations that represent sectors
of the poor can, and in Sa˜o Paulo do in substan-
tial numbers, participate in participatory policy
processes alongside individual citizens. (ii) Ties
to political parties and contractual relations
with state agencies can increase (rather than
reduce) the ability of civil organizations to rep-
resent the poor in these processes. (iii) Civil
organizations have differential capacities for
participation and constitute a highly diverse
universe, offering different sectors of the poor
different ways to access participatory policy
processes. Because (iv) only a minority of civil
organizations are membership based, it is neces-
sary to explore not only questions related to
participation but also to representation, and in
particular what kinds of representation are
being constructed within participatory institu-
tions. (v) Institutional design of participatory
institutions influences which organizations par-
ticipate, and appears to neutralize some of the
advantages wealthier organizations might enjoy
over poorer ones.
The sixth lesson is conceptual. (vi) The dom-
inant civil society approach in international
development provides a poor guide to under-
standing ‘‘civil society’’ or participation. Its
strong normative belief in civil society as an
independent sphere of action, separate from
that of politics, with its own unifying (and vir-
tuous) logic is not supported by our findings. 4
There is no discernable unifying logic (coopera-
tive, deliberative, or other) among the complexuniverse of organizations in our survey and it is
the nexus between civil and political society
that is the most important for understanding
participation. To understand the dynamics of
participation, including why ties to political ac-
tors and institutional design shape participa-
tion, requires that we rethink the boundaries
between direct and representative forms of
democracy, a move made possible within a
polity-centered approach (Houtzager, 2003).
In a polity approach, participatory institu-
tions are understood as political products,
negotiated in an iterative process between state
and societal actors. It suggests that negotiated
institutional design features will favor some ac-
tors over others. 5 Using a polity approach, we
suggest that civil organizations with ties to
political parties and government agencies par-
ticipate at higher rates because they have (a) a
greater chance to influence the design of partic-
ipatory institutions and engineer their access
and, at a subsequent stage, (b) greater facility
in obtaining policy-related and political infor-
mation, as well as legal and technical expertise.
In making this argument, we avoid the heavy
normative load and analytic assumptions asso-
ciated with the concept of civil society by using
the more normatively and theoretically neutral
civil organizations.
The last lesson is policy oriented. (vii) When
organizations that represent the poor partici-
pate in the design of participatory spaces, they
have a one-off opportunity to engineer their
institutional access and thus facilitate their
future representation of low-income groups.
The survey on which this paper is based was
undertaken in a single city, and it would be
foolhardy to claim that its findings are general-
izable across national contexts. We do believe,
however, that the study’s comparative strat-
egy—between organizations that participate
and those that do not different types of organi-
zations, and different types of participatory
institutions—has produced strong enough find-
ings to raise basic questions about the civil soci-
ety approach that shapes much conceptual and
empirical work on civil society and participa-
tion.2. INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS
IN SA˜O PAULO
The city of Sa˜o Paulo is a veritable labora-
tory of citizen participation. It contains a wide
array of participatory institutional arrange-
BEYOND COMPARATIVE ANECDOTALISM 953ments, a diverse set of political and societal
actors who can participate, and a variety of
moments in the policy process during which
participation is possible. Decentralization re-
forms initiated in Brazil with the postauthori-
tarian Constitution of 1988 have sought to
enhance both the responsiveness and efficiency
of the state by, among other measures, increas-
ing opportunities—beyond the electoral cycle
and legislative bodies—for citizen voice in
policy making and for holding government
accountable. In addition to shifting a larger
share of tax revenue to state and municipal
governments, along with greater decision mak-
ing authority, the novelty of the new participa-
tory institutions in Brazil is that they bring
citizens directly into executive branch policy
making, in such policy areas as health, educa-
tion, housing, or more broadly in municipal
budgeting. We are thus not talking about par-
ticipation in the elected local territorial govern-
ments that one finds in much of the world, and
that have been the centerpiece of most recent
devolution reforms in Africa, South Asia, and
elsewhere.
For the sake of the analysis undertaken here
we grouped Sa˜o Paulo’s participatory institu-
tions into three categories: the Participatory
budget, sectoral Policy councils, and Any Partic-
ipatory Fora. The last category includes a host
of less common participatory councils, commit-
tees, and programs, as well as the participatory
budget and policy councils. The advantage of
including the latter two in Any Participatory
Fora is a large sample size with which to work
and the ability to analyze a diverse grouping of
participatory spaces that are rarely studied.
Participation in these three groups of institu-
tions occurs in a variety of ways. The new
participatory institutions were intentionally de-
signed to include civil organizations, and in
some cases individual citizens, in the different
moments of public decision making and ac-
tion—in the design of policy and regulation,
in supervising or monitoring implementation,
and even in the implementation of policy or
management of programs. It is not necessary,
for our analytic purposes, however, to distin-
guish between the different forms of participa-
tion. The important analytic point is that
participation occurs in institutionally defined
mechanisms and moments. Neither is it neces-
sary for us to take into account the frequency
or intensity of participation. It is possible to
affirm, however, that the vast majority of the
actors which participate in one or more institu-tion, stated that, to them, participation was
either ‘‘very important’’ or ‘‘indispensable’’.
The Participatory Budget (PB) is the best-
known experiment in the democratization of
public policy in Brazil and possibly elsewhere.
In Sa˜o Paulo, the budgeting process is currently
in its fourth year. At the time of the survey in
2002, the spending priorities of approximately
a third of the municipal budget for public
investment, or 12% of the total municipal bud-
get, were set in the participatory budgeting pro-
cess. The municipal administration estimates
that 34,000 people participated in the first bud-
geting exercise in 2001, then 55,000 and 80,000
in the subsequent two years.
Officially, the PB involves both direct citizen
participation and in a second phase, elected del-
egates who serve as representatives. By law,
only individuals can participate, and studies
of the PB have focused on participants as indi-
vidual citizens. However, leaders of community
and other organizations participate at substan-
tial rates in the PB, and in our survey, such
leaders stated that their organizations had par-
ticipated—that is, they did not distinguish be-
tween their participation and that of their
organization. 6 Other studies show that partici-
pation of such leaders of civil organizations is
widespread in PBs throughout Brazil and has
considerable weight—they are far more likely
to be elected as delegates for later rounds in
the PB cycle. For example, in the PB of the cit-
ies of Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Recife,
Santo Andre´, and Sa˜o Paulo over half the dele-
gates elected during the first round of the PB
were leaders of civil organizations (Wampler,
2004a, 2004b, Table 3).
The Sa˜o Paulo PB has evolved in the last four
years, but since 2002, the core features have re-
mained the same. There are two cycles—a The-
matic (Policy) Cycle and a Territorial Cycle.
The Thematic Cycle starts with assemblies in
nine regions of the city. After the Secretariats
of the municipal administration present their
programs to participants, the assembly defines
the priorities for the next year and elects dele-
gates to policy-area plenaries. These plenaries
set spending priorities and elect councilors to
the Coordination Council of the PB, which
oversees the administration’s implementation
of the decisions made during the budgeting pro-
cess and negotiates changes proposed by public
officials. 7
The Territorial Cycle follows a similar pro-
cess but with a few notable differences when it
comes to the breath of citizen participation
954 WORLD DEVELOPMENTand the types of demands participants are al-
lowed to make. Preparatory assemblies occur
in 270 small territorial divisions that cover the
entire city, and the deliberative assemblies are
organized according to the city’s 96 administra-
tive districts. Residents and delegates present
and debate proposals for public works and ser-
vices for their regions in the areas of education
and health, and, in a third area that is decided
by the assemblies themselves.
Larger cities in Brazil have a truly baroque
structure of participatory councils. The coun-
cils can, however, be classified as policy coun-
cils, program councils, issue-area councils,
and councils for specific public infrastructure
or autarkies. 8 Policy councils most closely fit
the widely held image of deliberative participa-
tory spaces and make up our variable Policy
councils. The other types of councils are in-
cluded in the variable Any Participatory Fora.
The policy councils are mandated by the fed-
eral Constitution of 1988 and have specific
implementing legislation. They are organized
in a federated structure that parallels that of
the government, in policy areas that the Consti-
tution itself defines as high priority—health,
education, rights of the child and adolescent,
and social services. They are, therefore, institu-
tions whose creation and areas of competence,
in addition to the forms of civil society partici-
pation, are legally mandated and guaranteed.
The councils have tripartite representation of
civil organizations, public authorities, and pro-
fessional associations of service providers in the
relevant policy area. The number of seats each
sector receives varies, however, as it is deter-
mined by specific enacting legislation or by
the Council’s internal statutes. 9
Any Participatory Fora contains not just the
less prominent types of councils but also a
mix of other institutionalized forms of citizen
participation that link societal and state actors
to facilitate consultation, regulation, or the de-
sign or implementation of public policy. These
include working groups, committees, commis-
sions, and so forth. For reasons given above,
the variable also includes Participatory budget
and Policy councils.
(a) Civil organizations
The universe of civil organizations in Sa˜o
Paulo bears little resemblance to the portrait
found in the literature on civil society or on
citizen participation. It is extremely heteroge-
neous, defying the presumptive analytic unitysuggested by the CSO label. Furthermore, a
substantial majority are not membership based.
Organizations’ relations to their beneficiaries or
constituencies range from members who are
individuals to members that are other organiza-
tions, from target populations to imagined
communities that are either territorially defined
(such as the neighborhood) or defined in terms
of other identities (such as the homeless).
Although few have members, half of the orga-
nizations stated that beneficiaries ‘‘almost al-
ways’’ participated in the planning of their
activities, and a bit over half in the execution
of activities. Ties to political parties are not
uncommon: approximately 15% of the total
sample supported political candidates during
elections, while the share of neighborhood
associations who did so is far higher at 33%.
There is of course also a tremendous variation
in how organizations work, the issue areas they
cover (and whether they are single or multi-
issue organizations), the relations they have to
other civil organizations, or to parties or the
state.
We constructed a typology of organizations
in order to explore the differential capacities
for action, such as participation, in this diverse
universe. The typology is built using two ana-
lytic criteria: the type of activities organizations
undertake (such as service delivery to individu-
als, representation of groups or organizations
vis-a´-vis the state, defining problems as public
issues and influence policy debates, etc.) and
the nature of their relation to their stated mem-
bers/beneficiaries (membership of individuals
or of other organizations, the community, tar-
get population, or others). It is not, therefore,
derived inductively from the data. 10 The typol-
ogy has five categories, summarized in Table 1.
The distribution of each type is not representa-
tive of their share in the universe of societal ac-
tors. The size and the nature of this universe are
not knowable given the state of existing data
and depends on the definitional boundaries
one draws. The sampling technique produces
a purposeful over-representation of Coordina-
tors (which are relatively scarce) and under-
representation of local Associations (which
are numerous).
Associations encompass a variety of local and
territorially based actors who have either mem-
bers or who work on behalf of a territorially de-
fined ‘‘imagined community’’. Unlike in some
of the richest democracies, and the USA in par-
ticular, the number of organizations that have a
formal membership is small. Instead, a large
Table 1. Typology of civil organisations
Organization type Percent of sample Examples
Associations 27 —Neighborhood associations
—Community associations organized around specific activities,
such as those with a civic/cultural purpose
—Social movement organizations such as the Downtown Housing
Movement
Coordinators 20 —Popular Movements Central (a social movement coordinator)
—Association of Brazilian NGOs
—Association of Housing Movements of Sa˜o Paulo
Advocacy NGOs 27 —Popular education and community organizing centers
—Institutes concerned with gender, race, reproductive rights, AIDS,
the environment, etc.
Service nonprofits 15 —Baptist Association for the Encouragement and Support of Man
—Centers for social promotion
—Centers for professional training of youth
Others 11 —Corporate and other foundations
—Catholic church pastoral organization
—Rotary and Lions Clubs
Total sample 299
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sample define themselves as working for ‘‘the
community’’. The category also includes local
movement of the homeless such as the Down-
town Housing Movement, which works with
an imaginary community that is defined by an
attribute that is lacking—housing. Finally, the
category includes community associations of
various types.
In the absence of a formal membership, the
indicator that we take here of the kind of rela-
tion these organizations have to their ‘‘commu-
nity,’’ as they define it, is whether or not
community members participate in the plan-
ning and executing of the organizations’ activi-
ties. They do participate, and at a higher rate
than for the general sample: 60% of Associa-
tions stated community members participate
‘‘almost always’’ in planning of activities and
52% stated they did so in the execution. Orga-
nizations can, however, be expected to over-
state the true extent of participation, because
in the contemporary context such participation
is an important basis of legitimacy.
Coordinators encompass a variety of actors
which bring together other collective actors or
represent the interests of issue-based imagined
communities at the municipal, state, or na-
tional level. They are associations of organiza-
tions, such as the Union of Housing
Movements of Greater Sa˜o Paulo and the Inte-rior (UMM) and the Central of Popular Move-
ments (CMP), which coordinate city wide
movement networks, or the Network of Brazil-
ian Philanthropic Service Entities (REBRAF)
and the Brazilian Association of NGOs
(ABONG), which coordinate national net-
works. These diverse actors coordinate debate
and action amongst member organizations
and mediate relations with the state. The defini-
tion covers the types of federated national
organizations discussed by Skocpol (1992) and
Skocpol (1999) in the context of the 19th cen-
tury USA, which she found had organized local
chapters across that country, but in the case of
21st century Sa˜o Paulo, most coordinators are
created by local and regional civil organizations
and are more horizontally than vertically orga-
nized.
Advocacy NGOs is a specification of the con-
cept NGO. 11 The central task of these organi-
zations is the transformation of social problems
into public issues and campaigning around
those issues to influence public policy or private
behavior, whether at the local, national, or
transnational level. The relation Advocacy
NGOs such as Ac¸a˜o Educative (Education Ac-
tion) or Geledes (a black women’s rights orga-
nization) have to their beneficiaries is that of a
‘‘target population’’. There is often direct con-
tact but it is restricted and there is no formal
membership. In this regard, they are different
956 WORLD DEVELOPMENTfrom Advocacy NGOs in rich countries, where
organizations such as Green Peace have a large
formal membership body (although this mem-
bership is limited to contributing money). Sur-
prisingly, 40% of Advocacy NGOs claimed
that members of target population ‘‘almost al-
ways’’ participated in its planning activities
and 66% in execution of activities. This is far
closer to the percentages for Associations than
one might expect.
The primary mission of Service nonprofits is
service provision to the public. Service provi-
sion can be undertaken as charity or as part
of an empowerment strategy, but their benefi-
ciaries are individual clients. Service nonprofits
include actors who provide professional train-
ing or employment counseling, medical care,
and shelter for battered women. Many in Sa˜o
Paulo have a religious basis and deliver services
on behalf of the state to specific client popula-
tions. Some service nonprofits do make de-
mands on the government and participate in
collective action, but it is not a core activity.
Although the share of service nonprofits that
stated that their clients participated ‘‘almost al-
ways’’ in planning activities is lower than for
Associations, as one might expect, it is again
surprisingly high at 40%. For execution of
activities, this drops to 31%.
The category Other includes a broad range of
actors which have only a small representation in
the sample. These include philanthropic foun-
dations, pastoral organizations of the Catholic
Church, and such classic civil society actors as
the Lions and Rotary clubs. Combined they
make up 11% of the sample, but individually,
each type is statistically insignificant.3. SURVEY AND STATISTICAL
METHODS
Two features distinguish this paper from the
first wave empirical work on civil society, par-
ticipatory institutions and their intersection.
First, its comparative strategy makes possible
testing a series of hypotheses about which con-
stellations of factors affect participation—our
universe includes both organizations that par-
ticipate and those that do not, different types
of organizations, and different forms of partic-
ipatory institutions. Initial research in low and
middle-income countries are detailed case stud-
ies that examine particular civil society actors
or participatory experiences. On the one hand,
these studies provide a wealth of informationand insights, but, on the other hand, they select
on the dependent variable. Although this has a
variety of virtues, it inevitably introduces a
strong bias into analysis, and it is impossible
to know to what extent their findings can be
generalized. In order to draw broad generaliza-
tions, authors have engaged in forms of com-
parative anecdotalism—that is, studies herded
idiosyncratic cases from different contexts to-
gether into a single explanation. 12 These cases,
however, are rarely comparable because they
are either not instances of the same things or
occur in markedly dissimilar sociopolitical con-
texts.
Second, the survey of Sa˜o Paulo civil organi-
zations was designed to meet the challenges
posed by the diverse and disperse universe of
actors difficult to identify a priori. 13 The sam-
ple was drawn using a snowball technique,
which relies on ‘‘chain referrals’’ to build up
a sample that is purposefully targeted, and
hence not random. 14 The interviews that start
in snowball samples have a particularly big im-
pact on the composition of the sample and can
produce unwanted selection bias. We therefore
diversified our starting points as much as possi-
ble: the snowball had 20 different starting
points, distributed across four different lower-
income regions of the city. 15
The statistical techniques used in the paper
are appropriate for dichotomous variables—
univariate relative risk ratios and multivariate
logistic regressions. The three dependent vari-
ables—Participatory budget, Policy councils,
or Any Participatory Fora—are dichotomous.
We first used univariate relative risk ratios to
identify a number of factors that increase ac-
tors’ propensity to participate in the three types
of participatory institutional arrangements.
Then, we identified which of these factors have
the greatest influence on the propensity to par-
ticipate, when all the significant factors are con-
trolled for. To do so, we created a number of
statistical models using multivariate logistic
regressions. We obtained three different models
that are applicable and are valid for the three
types of participatory institutions. Finally, we
examined the goodness of fit and the possibility
of sample selection bias in the data.
Tests for biasness confirm that the sample
does not suffer from unwanted bias that can
arise in simpler snowball sampling strategies.
Our findings, for example, show strong effects
of PT-ties and government contracts on actors’
participation in all three types of institutional
arrangements. It is possible that actors with
BEYOND COMPARATIVE ANECDOTALISM 957PT-ties only had relations with actors who also
had such ties. Once a snowball enters such a
network of actors, it can be difficult to escape.
The same applies for actors with government
contracts. We therefore checked for these two
potential sources of bias, however, and found
no indications of such bias. 16 We are confident
that, using the modified snowball technique,
our sample is representative of civil organiza-
tions that work with lower income groups and
are more active.4. FINDINGS: WHO PARTICIPATES?
The core dynamics of civil society participa-
tion in Sa˜o Paulo offer important confirmation
that the new participatory institutions create
opportunities for organizations who work with
lower income groups to acquire a voice in public
policy. All three types of institutions provide
opportunities for such actors. Their participa-
tion is high, particularly when one takes into ac-
count that these institutional arrangements are
relatively recent creations: 33% of the 229 actors
interviewed took part in the Participatory bud-
get, 34 in the Policy councils, and 59% partici-
pated Any Participatory Fora. Moreover, they
do so irrespective of their ‘‘wealth’’ (Budget
size). Rich and poor civil organizations in our
sample, which range from annual budgets of
$0 to well over $3 million, are as likely to partic-
ipate in all three institutional arrangements.
Simple logistic regressions show that actors’
budget size, in the sample of collective actors
who work with lower-middle class, working
class, and the poor, does not affect participation.Table 2. Three mode
Participatory budg
Pseudo-R2 0.2138
Ties to PT 3.68**





As we have two control variables—ties to PT and Contra
understood simply in terms of odds ratios with respect to t
IDS–LSE–CEBRAP, ‘‘Rights, Representation and the Poo
No asterisk implies statistical nonsignificance.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.The principal hypothesis we wanted to ex-
plore was whether actors with ties to traditional
political actors such as parties, unions, and the
state were more likely to participate than actors
without such ties. We were also interested in
finding out (i) whether the different actors
authorized in the literature as authentic civil
society—NGOs or local associations—are more
likely to participate than others actors and (ii)
whether our typology captured basic distinc-
tions between actors that might influence partic-
ipation. Finally, to test whether institutional
design of participatory spaces matter—that is,
the rules that define the composition, mandate,
and internal, procedures—we created a different
model for each institutional arrangement.
The basic structural model therefore centers
on the relationship of actors to political parties
and the state and included Advocacy NGO,
Coordinator, Association, and Other. 17 Table
2 presents the models for each of the three
dependent variables. Advocacy NGO, Coordi-
nator, Association, and Other are mutually
exclusive and exhaustive of types of actors. Ser-
vice NonProfit is the reference category and
therefore left out of all three regressions. 18 Ties
to the PT and Contractual relations with the
state are not mutually exclusive and act as con-
trols for each other as well as other variables.
We also used relative risk ratios to identity
whether a wide range of other factors might al-
ter the propensity to participate in any of the
institutional settings, such as the period during
which organizations were created, the issue
area on which they work, whether they had ties
to other civil organizations, what kinds of ac-
tors helped create the organization, and so
forth. The factors that proved significant werels of participation








ctual Relation with state, the odds ratios should not be
he reference category of Service nonprofits. Data source:
r: Association Survey—Sa˜o Paulo, 2000’’.
958 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthen added to the multivariate logistic regres-
sions.
Of the three models in Table 2, we can say the
most about the Participatory budget, then the
Any Participatory Fora, and far less about
participation in Policy councils. The pseudo-
R2 offers a measure of the goodness of fit; the
interpretation of these values is less intuitive
than R2 in linear models. For that reason, we
conducted goodness of fit tests. The first good-
ness of fit test for participation in Any Arrange-
ment yielded 20 covariate patterns with a
Pearson v2 of 16.72; thus showing that the
model cannot be rejected at the 21% level.
The same test showed that the model for partic-
ipation in the budget could not be rejected at
the 60% level. Thus, our results are particularly
strong for participation in the budget. Partici-
pation in councils could not be rejected at the
13% level. Although our results are weak for
participation in the councils, we are confident
that these models provide interesting explana-
tions for determining factors in all of the three
participatory institutions. 19 The significance
level and trends are more important than the
values.
Ties to the Worker’s Party or to the govern-
ment via contracts to deliver services, along
with being coordinators or associations, are
the best predictors of participation in all three
types of participatory spaces. 20 The size of
the government’s contribution to an actor’s
budget, or the share of the actor’s budget it ac-
counts for, however, does not influence partici-
pation.
The importance of Ties to PT raises the ques-
tion whether the significance of relations with
the party reflects the fact that it was in office
at the time of the survey. Did organizations
who participate establish ties to the PT after
it took over the municipal administration in
2000? The answer appears to be no. The over-
whelming majority of actors with ties to the
PT had established those ties well before the
party won the municipal elections in 2000.
The mean length of time for such ties is over
12 years.
The finding also raises the question, ‘‘Are
participators with contractual ties to the state
simply clients in patron–client chains or are
they coopted in other ways?’’ We tested
whether actors with government contracts were
less likely than other actors to engage in
the organization of protests and other forms
of mobilizational (extra-institutional) politics.
The opposite is in fact that case. Actors whoengage in mobilizational politics (protest and
demonstrations) are considerably more likely
to be involved in the participatory budget. This
finding is consistent with arguments in the so-
cial movement literature that groups who en-
gage in extra-institutional activity are often
also involved in institutionalized channels of
politics (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2002).
There are studies that suggest relations to
organized labor and sectors of the Catholic
Church could influence participation of civil
organizations. 21 Although a substantial share
of actors did have relations with labor unions
or sectors of the Catholic Church, both close
to 40% of the sample, there is no statistical ef-
fect of these relations on the propensity to par-
ticipate in any of the three types of institutional
arrangements.
The three models show that different types of
organizations have significantly different pro-
pensities to participate in the three types of
spaces. The poor therefore obtain different lev-
els and forms of representation by type of actor
and type of participatory space. The values in
each model should be compared to Service
NonProfits that provide services to individual
clients. Although the coefficients presented in
Table 2 should not be taken too literally, actors
that are Coordinators are roughly eight times
more likely to participate in the government
space than actors that are Service NonProfits.
Thus, Coordinators are roughly three times
more likely to participate than Associations.
Similar conclusions follow for other variables
in the model. The three models do not support
a narrow focus on Advocacy NGOs as the prin-
cipal participatory agents—Advocacy NGOs
are no more likely to participate than non-
Advocacy NGOs. Instead, they show that local
Associations and Coordinators have substan-
tially higher propensities to participate. As
one might expect, because of their focus on
serving individual clients, Service NonProfits
(the reference category) have a lower propen-
sity to participate than other actors. Overall,
the variation across the categories of civil orga-
nizations suggests that the typology does cap-
ture important distinctions, that, among other
things, influence participation.
The models also identify an important divi-
sion of labor between local Associations and
Coordinators. Associations participate at high
levels in the participatory budget and at much
lower levels in the policy councils. Coordina-
tors participate at high levels in the councils
(they are nearly six times more likely than non-
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lower than associations) in budgeting.
The effects of institutional design on partici-
pation should be visible in variation across
the three models and also in the thematic areas
organizations work. The three models do in-
deed vary, suggesting that the differences in
institutional design of each type of participa-
tory institution may be affecting participation.
Table 2 shows that design effects on participa-
tion are statistically significant, but their influ-
ence varies according to the type of actor.
There are strong interaction effects between
type of actor and institutional design of the
participatory space. Conceptually, this is not
a problem: the participatory budget and coun-
cils are designed to draw in particular types of
actors—such as neighborhood associations or
coordinating bodies. And while coordinators
have far higher participation rates in councils
than they do in the participatory budget, asso-
ciations have the reverse pattern.
The issue areas on which actors work are not
significant, with one important exception.
Organizations who work primarily in health
are more likely to participate in the Participa-
tory budget. (This ‘‘issue area effect’’ is not pres-
ent for councils, for reasons given above. 22)
Health, along with education, is a mandatory
issue area in the participatory budget, and
hence, there are institutional mechanisms and
incentives that encourage participation in this
area. The importance of institutional design
therefore receives some support from this find-
ing. However, the other mandatory policy area
in the budgeting process—education—has not
stimulate similar participation. Institutional de-
sign therefore cannot be the entire explanation.
The next section explores what other factors
may contribute to participation in the case of
health.
There are other factors that affect participa-
tion but do not weaken the relations in the
structural models shown in Table 2. For exam-
ple, involvement in civil society forums makes
participation around 70% more likely in Policy
councils. The presence of ties to association in-
creases the probability of participation in Any
Participatory Fora. Organizations that have ties
to Coordinators are half as likely to participate
in Policy councils, although Coordinators
themselves participate at relatively high rates
in councils. The explanation for this inverse
relationship, between participation in councils
and ties to coordinators, may lie in a division
of labor among civil society actors in whichthe council seats are in large measure occupied
by coordinators. Councils are after all munici-
palwide bodies. Associations with ties to coor-
dinators who have seats would therefore have
little reason to participate. This interpretation
has some support from the fact that coordina-
tors have in large measure been created by
other civil organizations.5. SEVEN LESSONS FROM SA˜O PAULO
Most of the lessons from Sa˜o Paulo run
counter to the conventional wisdom on civil
society and participation. The first lesson is that
‘‘citizen participation’’ is a combination of
engagement by civil organizations and individ-
ual citizens. A substantial share of organiza-
tions participate in the PB, policy councils,
and other participatory institutions. Although
the PB’s rules stipulate that only individual cit-
izens can participate, the data show that leaders
of community and neighborhood organizations
participate at high rates and carry their organi-
zations with them. Furthermore, such leaders
are disproportionately elected as delegates to
higher-level decision making bodies in the bud-
geting cycle, providing civil organizations con-
siderable influence in the PB.
Lesson number two is that our understanding
of civil organizations and participatory institu-
tions needs to broaden dramatically to address
the representation of the poor. The representa-
tional activities of civil organizations raises
important questions about the forms of repre-
sentation that are being constructed in the new
participatory institutions, and how these new
forms of representation involve ordinary citi-
zens in policy making. Only a minority of par-
ticipating organizations have formal members,
yet involvement of intended beneficiaries in
organizations’ planning and implementation is
common. The survey data do not allow us to
verify with any precision whether the claim that
neighborhood and other community associa-
tions in Brazil have, since the mid-1970s,
encourage high levels of community Participa-
tion in their activities (Alvarez, 1993; Costa,
1994). The ambiguous picture of the relation be-
tween civil organizations and their beneficiaries
provided by the survey suggests, however, that
such affirmations cannot be taken at face value.
Lesson three is that the actors best able to
represent the interests of the people living in
poverty are those who establish ties to agents
of representative democracy. The politics of
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are intimately connected. Organizations with
ties to political actors, particularly political
parties or state agencies, are more active repre-
sentatives of the poor than those lacking such
ties. They are considerably more likely to par-
ticipate, and they are also more likely to engage
in public demonstrations and other forms of
demand making on the state. Such ties to par-
ties and the state, therefore, do not automati-
cally lead to cooptation or depoliticization. It
is possible that the highly competitive political
system in Sa˜o Paulo—parties from the left, cen-
ter, and right regularly alternate in power and
compete for small electoral margins—counters
some of the tendencies toward cooptation that
are said to accompany such ties elsewhere.
These findings from Sa˜o Paulo counter
assumptions of the civil society approach but
fit well with a substantial literature that empha-
sizes the role political actors’ play in negotiat-
ing conflict within segments of civil society
and in coordinating or facilitating their interac-
tion with state bureaucracies. 23 For example,
in their review of the 12 democratic decentral-
ization reforms in South Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, Crook and Sverrisson (2003,
p. 254) reach a similar conclusion. The extent
to which these reforms increased government
responsiveness to the poor, and enhanced
participation specifically, varied significantly
according to political regime dynamics, and
especially relation between central ruling elites
and local elites and the dynamics of political
parties.
Lesson four is that civil organizations make
up a highly diverse universe and lack the clear
or ‘‘unique’’ logic suggested by the civil society
approach. They have variable relations to their
beneficiaries or constituencies and distinct
capacities to participate. The type of organiza-
tion favored in many civil society analysis,
Advocacy NGOs, are no more active partici-
pants than other actors in Sa˜o Paulo. In
contrast, Coordinators and local-level Associa-
tions have far greater propensities to partici-
pate. Coordinators participate more in policy
councils; and, Associations are far more likely
than other actors to be present in the participa-
tory budget.
The fifth lesson is that the institutional design
of participatory arrangements does have signif-
icant effects on who participates. Variation in
the significance of the main variables in the
three models suggests this is the case. Institu-
tional design, as Fung and Wright (2003),Avritzer (2003), and others argue, can counter
some of the effects of social inequality and ac-
tors’ variable capacity for action. Indeed, one
reasonable interpretation of the wealth find-
ing—that rich and poor organizations have
similar propensities to participate—is that in-
come-based differentiation among civil organi-
zations working with or for the poor is
counteracted by other factors, such as institu-
tional rules that set out criteria for participa-
tion, formula for representation, the territorial
distribution of physical spaces for participa-
tion, and so on. Such rules favor the participa-
tion of certain kinds of actors over others. The
design of the PB, for example, includes two cy-
cles that favor different types of actors. The ter-
ritorial cycle is designed to facilitate access of
local territorially-based associations (such as
neighborhood associations) with an interest in
obtaining urban infrastructure, while the the-
matic cycle favors issue-based organizations
that work on policy at a municipal level. The
rules governing policy councils are also de-
signed to favor issue-based organizations, as
well as those representing particular types of
users and worker organizations, irrespective
of territorial base.
There is ample evidence, however, that
similar institutional arrangements have dra-
matically different effects in different contexts
(Evans, 2003; Putnam, 1993). Institutional de-
sign alone cannot explain variation in partici-
pation.
Lesson six is conceptual. To understand why
ties to politics actors and institutional design
shape participation, we need to shift from a
civil society approach to a broader view of
the polity (Houtzager, 2003). The civil society
approach draws misleading conclusions from
the findings above because it (i) does not make
basic analytic distinctions within civil society,
either between the participation of individual
and of collective actors or between that of dif-
ferent types of collective actors; (ii) it insists
on the separateness of CSOs from politics and
ignores the effects of political dynamics on civil
society and participation; and (iii) it focuses on
the importance of the institutional design of
participatory processes in a way that is ab-
stracted from context-specific relations between
local actors who seek to mobilize these institu-
tions. In contrast, the polity approach ‘‘focuses
on how particular societal and state actors are
constituted, how they develop a differential
capacity for action and to form alliances, and
how they cooperate and compete across the
BEYOND COMPARATIVE ANECDOTALISM 961public/private divide to produce purposeful
change’’ (Houtzager, 2003, p. 2). Here, the
capacity of political actors to produce a politics
of inclusion is shaped both by the institutional
terrain in which they operate, and their success
in engineering ‘‘fit’’ with political institutions
able to grant leverage in policy processes.
For example, Alvarez (1993), Goldfrank
(2003), and others show that, in Brazil, net-
works of civil organizations are aware of the
importance of institutional design and have
sought to engineer their access to policy pro-
cesses during the moments when participatory
institutions were being crafted. In the iterative
state-society negotiation over the format of
new participatory institutions such as the PB
and sectoral policy councils, particular civil
organizations have had a greater influence on
the form these took than others, facilitating
their long-term access to these institutions.
Relations with progressive political parties
and contractual relations to the Brazilian state
played an important role in overcoming obsta-
cles to participation in two ways. First, they
provided particular civil organizations with a
greater opportunity to influence the design of
participatory institutions within legislative
bodies and within state agencies. Second, in
subsequent moments, they provided privileged
access to vital policy-related and political infor-
mation, to legal and technical expertise, as well
as to allies within government agencies. Organi-
zations that have contractual relations with the
state to deliver services may lack the first
advantage, but they have similar advantaged
access to information and allies within govern-
ment as those linked in to progressive political
networks.
The conceptual shift from civil society to the
polity brings to the fore a critical policy lesson
(number 7). Organizations that represent the
poor should play an important role in the de-
sign of participatory institutions. Providing
such an opportunity enables organizations of
the poor to negotiate a set of rules that govern
the functioning of participatory institutions
that facilitate their access and involvement.
The design phase of institutional building pro-vides a critical, possibly one-off, oppor-
tunity for such organizations to engineer their
access.6. CONCLUSION
Extensive fieldwork in Sa˜o Paulo points to the
substantial role civil organization play in repre-
senting people living in poverty in the policy
process. The dynamics of this representation
cannot be understood on the same terms as that
of individual citizen participation. Sectors of the
poor obtain very different levels and forms of
representation from civil organizations because
these vary tremendously, including in their
capacity to participate and in the type of rela-
tions they have to their beneficiaries/constituen-
cies. Local associations and coordinators are
more likely to participate in these processes
than advocacy NGOs or other types of civil
organizations. Civil organizations vary as well
in their ties to other (noncivil) actors and such
ties have fundamental consequences: organiza-
tions with ties to the principal actors of repre-
sentative democracy are the most likely to
participate in formal or quasi-formal processes
of public policy making.
These findings suggest that the dominant
perspective on civil society and participation
in international development—the civil society
approach—is a poor conceptual guide to
understanding contemporary patterns of par-
ticipation. It lacks the differentiated view of
civil organizations needed to understand
this extremely diverse universe of actors. It is
premised on a theoretical separation of direct
and representative democracy that in practice
does not appear to exist. A polity approach,
we have argued, provides a stronger analytic
basis for understanding the dynamics of partic-
ipation by civil organizations that represent the
poor, and the kinds of factors that shape that
participation. Such an approach brings to the
fore that participatory institutions are funda-
mentally political products, the rules of which
are negotiated by political actors with different
capacities.NOTES1. See among others, Abers (1998), Avritzer (2003),
Baiocchi (2001), Fung and Wright (2003), Chaudhuri
and Heller (2002), and Krishna (2003).2. This civil society approach can be found in studies
on participation within the deliberative democracy
literature, such as Fung and Wright (2003) and Avritzer
962 WORLD DEVELOPMENT(2003), and in the policy statements and publications of
national governments and international organizations
such as UNDP, the World Bank, or the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee. For general cri-
tiques of the civil society perspective, see Foley and
Edwards (1996), Harriss, Stokke, and To¨rnquist (2005),
Houtzager (2003), and Jenkins (2001).
3. See, for example, the large multicountry projects
undertaken by Santos, with MacArthur Foundation
support, ‘‘Reinventing Social Emancipation,’’ www.ces.
fe.uc.pt/emancipa; the Ford Foundation, ‘‘Civil Society
and Governance Project,’’ http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civ-
soc/index.html and on Brazil specifically Dagnino, 2003;
as well as research of The Johns Hopkins Center for
Civil Society Studies at http://www.jhu.edu/~ccss/ and in
Saloman et al. (1999). Second wave studies include
Baiocchi (2003), Chaudhuri and Heller (2002), Krishna
(2003), Mendes (2004), Scho¨nleitner (2005), and Wam-
pler (2004b).
4. This logic is one of ‘‘cooperation for mutual gain’’
(Putnam, 1993), or of public reasoning that produces
moral consensus and concrete solutions (Cohen, 1998;
Cohen & Arato, 1992).
5. This focus on the ‘‘polity’’ builds in particular on the
insights of historical institutionalists such as Evans
(1995, 1996), Skocpol (1992), Skocpol and Fiorina
(1999), Tilly (1978), and Tilly (1997).
6. Abers (1998), Avritzer (2003), Baiocchi (2001, 2003),
and Santos (1998, 2002).
7. Among the 92 councilors of CONOP in 2003, only,
14 represented the municipal administration. The coun-
cil also had seats for eight associations that work with
special segments of the population, such as women, afro-
Brazilians, the homeless, the disabled, children and
adolescents, gay and lesbians, and Indians, as well as
four representatives appointed by the respective Muni-
cipal deliberative councils.
8. This typology is a modified version of Tatagiba,
2002.
9. Furthermore, in most cases, the number of seats for
civil society actors is legally specified, and in a few
instances even the actual actors are specified.
10. The use of this classification is not limited to work
that adopts a civil society perspective (cf. Evans, 2002,
footnotes 16 and 30).
11. We were forced into this specification when we
found that over 40% of our sample identified itself as
NGOs, despite differing markedly in terms of activities,organizational structures, relations to members/benefi-
ciaries, and so forth. Many actors appear to use the label
NGO for the purposes of public self-representation.
12. See references in endnote 2.
13. In Sa˜o Paulo, as in most cities, there is no reliable
listing of associational life from which a random (or
weighted) sample could be drawn. Such a listing would
also entail accepting a prior definition of what is
associational life or civil society, which we wanted to
avoid.
14. Constructing a universe from the rosters of the
participatory institutions had its own problems, not the
least of which is losing the ability to compare actors who
participate with those who are active but do not
participate. At the extreme, using lists of entities
participating in councils, under these conditions, makes
an inference blind to the universe of excluded associa-
tions. On snowball sampling, see Atkinson and Flint
(n/a), Goodman (1961), and Sudman and Kalton (1986).
15. In each region, we began mini-snowballs by inter-
viewing a local organization recommended as very active
in working with the community by (1) a local represen-
tatives of the Catholic Church; (2) a representative of an
evangelical church; and (3) a local government repre-
sentatives. A fourth organization was selected from a list
of neighborhood association drawn from the Cadastro
Geral de Empresas do IBGE (General Registry of
Companies). The latter is by far the most complete list
of civil organizations, but organizations that do not have
tax registration are excluded. In cases where an organi-
zation provided few referrals we added a fifth interview
from the same source who had indicated that organiza-
tion.
16. Using the model with the highest explanatory
power we find that while nearly 58% of our sample of
actors participates, our model predicts that 50% of our
sample would participate even if these actors had no ties
to PT and 46% would participate even if they had no
contractual obligations, although proportions are higher
for either of these types of organizations. A second
possible source of over-sampling of actors with PT ties
or contracts is if these actors have extremely high
participation rates. In that case, naming any actor with
ties to the PT or government contract would influence
participation positively. In fact, only 16% of actors with
ties to the PT do not participate in the government space,
while 25% of the contract holders do not.
17. The dataset has two indicators for ties/autonomy to
political parties: whether the actor declares that it has (i)
formal or informal ties to political parties or to the
BEYOND COMPARATIVE ANECDOTALISM 963Worker’s Party in particular, and (ii) supported a
political candidate in recent elections. Because ties to
parties and to the Worker’s Party co-varied significantly
we used Tie to PT to obtain a more precise result.
Support for candidates was not significant in the risk
ratios and was droped. For ties to political parties,
religious organizations and unions we used interviewees’
declaration of whether such ties existed or not. For ties
to government, we used a question that asked specif-
ically whether the organization had a contract to deliver
services with the government. The dataset had a number
of other variables that measured institutional ties to the
state, including the share of an actors’ budget that came
from pubic funding, but Contract consistently gave the
strongest results.18. Inclusion of Service NonProfit would make the
model completely multicolinear—that is, there would be
no variation amongst the categories of types and they
would always add up to 1. The interpretation of the
results, however, does not depend on which category is
used as the reference.
19. Although the meanings assigned to both odds
ratios and relative risk ratios are essentially the same, the
formulae differ. The qualitative results are not likely to
differ.
20. It is possible that actors with PT ties and govern-
ment contracts participate at high rates for some reasons
other than the fact they have these two characteristics.We believe that there are no strong statistical instru-
ments which we could use to test for this kind of latent
variable problem in this dataset. However, only the 20
starting points were selected to be from the most active
segment of civil organizations. Whether the actors these
initial interviewees stated having relations with, and
which where subsequently interviewed, belong to the
most active segment we do not know.
21. Seidman’s (1994) work on urban labor in Brazil,
which suggests that unions associated with the Central
U´nica dos Trabalhadores (CUT) represent a form of
social movement unionism that flows from the work-
place into urban communities, raises such a possibility.
A similar possibility is raised by Diomo (1995), and
many other works, on the crucial role progressive sectors
of the Catholic Church played in creating and support-
ing community organisations and social movements,
particularly during the 1980s.
22. In the case of the policy councils, it is very likely
that the lack of statistically significant results for health
is related to the small number of actors who participate
in any one council. When all policy councils are taken
together, the number of participating actors in the
sample is substantial, but when disaggregating by
particular sectoral councils, such as health, the statistical
results are not significant.
23. For a discussion on this topic, see Houtzager (2003,
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